Publication

Abstract : pThe Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) has evolved as a promising future security solution to performs an indirect investigation of the untrustworthy Guest Virtual Machine (GVM) in real-time by operating at the hypervisor in a virtualized cloud environment. The existing VMI techniques are not intelligent enough to read precisely the manipulated semantic information on their reconstructed high-level semantic view of the live GVM. In this paper, a VMI-based Automated-Internal-External (A-IntExt) system is presented that seamlessly introspects the untrustworthy Windows GVM internal semantic view (i.e. Processes) to detect the hidden, dead, and malicious processes. Further, it checks the detected, hidden as well as running processes (not hidden) as benign or malicious. The prime component of the A-IntExt is the Intelligent Cross-View Analyzer (ICVA), which is responsible for detecting hidden-state information from internally and externally gathered state information of the Monitored Virtual Machine ( {$}{$}M{_}{{}ed-VM{}}{$}{$} ). The A-IntExt is designed, implemented, and evaluated by using publicly available malware and Windows real-world rootkits to measure detection proficiency as well as execution speed. The experimental results demonstrate that A-IntExt is effective in detecting malicious and hidden-state information rapidly with maximum performance overhead of 7.2nbsp;{%}./p