Publication

Abstract : The expansion of the semiconductor industry has made integrated circuits (ICs) more vulnerable to deliberate design alterations. An insertion of extra circuitry or an intentional alteration of integrated circuits that alters the circuit’s operation is referred to as a Hardware Trojan (HT). It’s critical to detect these Trojans since they could raise major concerns about hardware trust, particularly in military and security applications. To detect HTs, different methods are used, such as side-channel analysis, computation of delay in the path HT is inserted, golden reference method, and so on. However, due to different factors such as process variation and noise, their efficiency is restricted. This paper focuses on detecting the presence of Trojan with and without golden reference using path delay analysis. The golden reference approach is performed by generating the timing report of the path with and without the HT using the Xilinx Vivado Design Suite 2020.2. MUX-based latch technique is considered without the golden reference analysis. This approach can accurately detect even small HTs and overcome side-channel analysis constraints, making it self-reference based with reliability and accuracy.